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I n this case of first impres-sion, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit reversed and remanded the 
issue of damages on the basis of 
plaintiff s counsel's reference to 
the federal statutory non-economic 
damages cap during closing argu-
ments. In Sasaki v. Class, 92 F.3d 
232 (4th Cir. 1996), the court held 
that Congress intended to prohibit 
both judges and attorneys from 
mentioning the cap so juries would 
not be compelled to adjust the 
verdicts upward or downward to 
account for the caps. 
Mee Sook Sasaki ("Sasaki") 
filed suit against her employer, 
JL W Produce, and its president, 
Robert Class ("Class"), alleging 
that Class sexually harassed her for 
several years in violation of 42 
U.S.C. § 1981a (1994). Sasaki 
also alleged that Class assaulted 
and battered her in violation of 
Maryland law. During closing 
arguments, Sasaki's counsel ar-
gued that the jury could award 
Sasaki up to $50,000 in compensa-
tory damages for emotional pain, 
suffering, inconvenience, and men-
tal anguish in her sexual harass-
ment claim. Defense counsel's 
objection was overruled. Sasaki's 
counsel continued his argument by 
noting that state law permitted the 
jury to award Sasaki up to 
$500,000 for each battery. 
The jury returned a verdict in 
favor of Sasaki and awarded her 
$61,250 for her sexual harassment 
claim, $150,000 for her assault and 
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battery claims, and $65,000 in 
punitive damages. The trial court, 
however, denied Sasaki's request 
for attorney's fees and costs be-
cause she received "generous" 
damage awards totaling $276,250. 
Class appealed on several 
grounds. First, Class argued that 
the trial court's erroneous permis-
sion of Sasaki's counsel to refer-
ence the federal statutory damages 
cap during closing arguments vio-
lated 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(2). 
Second, Class argued that the trial 
judge improperly refused voir dire 
of prospective jurors to determine 
if any had experienced sexual 
harassment. Third, Class appealed 
several evidentiary and instruction-
al errors. Sasaki cross-appealed 
contending that the trial judge 
abused his discretion when he 
denied her request for attorney's 
fees. 
Sasaki asserted three defenses 
to Class's first argument. First, 
Sasaki argued that § 1981 a( c )(2) 
pertained only to the judiciary 
because the statute specifically 
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stated that the "court" shall not 
inform the jury of the damages 
cap. Sasaki, 92 F.3d at 236. The 
court agreed that the statute specif-
ically prohibited the court from 
making reference to the cap. The 
court held, however, that the stat-
ute's legislative history indicated 
that Congress intended to prohibit 
both judges and attorneys from 
informing the jury of the damages 
cap. Id. Specifically, Congress 
enacted the bill to ensure that the 
jury would not be pressured to 
adjust the damage awards upward 
or downward to account for the 
federal statutory damages cap. ld. 
Therefore, the court held, limiting 
this restriction to judges would, in 
effect, undermine congressional 
intent. Id. 
Second, Sasaki argued Class 
opened the door to her counsel's 
statement during closing ar-
guments when they portrayed her 
as a greedy person seeking mil-
lions of dollars. Id. The court 
disagreed and held that counsel's 
reference to the federal damages 
cap did not dispel the inference 
that she was greedy, inasmuch as 
Sasaki did ask the jury to award 
her millions of dollars on her state 
law claims. Id. 
Finally, Sasaki argued, assum-
ing arguendo that her counsel's 
statement was error, the error did 
not harm or prejudice Class pursu-
ant to Rule 61 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Jd. The court, 
however, held that counsel's refer-
ence to the federal damages cap 
27.1 U. Bait. L.F. 47 
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accomplished exactly what Con-
gress intended to prevent. N ame-
ly, the reference pressured the jury 
to adjust their award to account for 
the damages cap. Id. at 237. 
Essentially, the court found 
that counsel's closing argument 
was interpreted by the jury to 
award Sasaki more for her state 
law claim because of the federal 
damages cap. This finding was 
evidenced by the fact that the jury 
awarded Sasaki $150,000 for the 
"lesser included state conduct and 
injury." Id. As a result, the court 
held that "when a jury's damages 
award itself indicates so strongly 
that the error substantially influ-
enced the jury verdict, the error 
cannot be dismissed as harmless." 
Id. 
For this reason, the court re-
manded on the issue of damages. 
Id. at 238. The court held, how-
ever, that Sasaki's counsel's refer-
ence to the federal statutory dam-
ages cap in no way affected the 
jury's findings that Class was lia-
ble and had acted willfully and 
maliciously. Id. Therefore, the 
jury's verdict on liability and the 
propriety of punitive damages was 
affirmed. Id. 
Class's second argument on 
appeal was that the trial judge im-
properly denied Class the right to 
an unbiased jury by refusing to ask 
prospective jurors whether they 
had ever been sexually harassed in 
the workplace. The court deter-
mined, after reviewing all voir dire 
questions presented by the parties, 
that the trial court's voir dire "ade-
quately covered the personal expe-
riences ... [of] the jurors ... [and 
27.1 U. Bait. L.F. 48 
therefore] it was unnecessary for 
the court to go to any great lengths 
to ensure that jurors revealed their 
potential prejudices." Id. at 240-
4l. 
Class's third argument alleged 
that the trial court failed to elabo-
rate its jury instructions to include 
the four factors, outlined in Harris 
v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 u.S. 17 
(1993), in determining whether 
Class's harassment created a hos-
tile environment. The court held 
that the trial judge did not abuse its 
discretion for the "instructions 
construed as whole, and in light of 
the whole record, adequately in-
formed the jury of the controlling 
legal principles without misleading 
or confusing the jury to the preju-
dice of the objecting party." Id. at 
242. (quoting Spell v. McDaniel, 
824 F.2d 1380 (4th Cir. 1987), 
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1027 
(1988)). 
Sasaki's cross-appeal argued 
that the trial judge improperly re-
fused to award her attorney's fees 
because of the generous award she 
received. The court agreed that a 
generous award on damages was 
not a proper rationale for the denial 
of attorney's fees. Id. at 243. 
Therefore, in addition to the issue 
of damages, the court remanded 
for reconsideration the appropri-
ateness of attorney's fees in this 
case. 
The ruling in Sasaki v. Class 
reflects the Fourth Circuit's 
attempt to interpret 42 U.S.C. § 
1981a(c)(2) consistent with the 
public policy considerations exem-
plified in the legislative history of 
the statute. By remanding this 
case for a new trial limited to the 
issues of damages and attorneys 
fees, the court's message is that 
juries must make determinations of 
damages solely by weighing the 
evidence. Furthermore, juries 
should not be compelled to adjust 
the verdicts upward or downward 
to account for the caps. Therefore, 
in order to avoid the expense of a 
new trial, attorneys should refrain 
from mentioning to the jury any 
limitations in awarding non-
economic damages. Nothing in 
this case, however, seems to pre-
vent attorneys from requesting a 
specific amount in damage awards. 
